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Published Dec 11, 2018
A deep dive: What happened to Wisconsin's offense?
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John Veldhuis  •  BadgerBlitz
Senior Writer
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@JohnVeldhuis

Expectations for Wisconsin's 2018 offense were sky high in early August - and for good reason. The Badgers were coming off of a season where they went 13-1, albeit against a soft schedule, but capped off the year by trouncing Miami in the Orange Bowl in a game that made it look like their passing game had come of age.

It was hard to look at the pieces the Badgers were bringing back in 2018 and not be optimistic about their chances to take another step forward. Among media members the hot question in the run up to the season was if the Badgers could pull off averaging 40 points a game, like they did in 2010 and 2011 in Paul Chryst's final two seasons as the team's offensive coordinator.

That was a lofty goal, but no one thought you were crazy for thinking about it. Because for the first time since the Badgers made three consecutive trips to the Rose Bowl you could look at the tools UW had to work with and see a path for them to have not just one of the best running games, but one of the best overall offenses in college football.

Instead the Badgers took a step back in 2018, averaging 29.3 points per game through 12 games with one bowl game - the 2018 New Era Pinstripe Bowl - left to play on Dec. 27. Wisconsin's youth-infused defense also had its fair share of issues to work through, but the offense's underperformance compared to last year (leaving aside their preseason expectations) was a major reason why the Badgers finished the regular season with a 7-5 record and failed to win the Big Ten West for the first time since 2015.

Why did an offense that returned a multi-year starter at quarterback, their entire offensive line, one of the best running backs in the nation, and what looked like Wisconsin's deepest group of wide receivers in several years fail to capitalize on their potential? Unfortunately for the Badgers it's a question that doesn't have a single answer - but there are some key parts of the offense that underperformed relative to last year that you can bet the Badgers will be looking to address as they head in to 2019.

It's Hard To Score Points When You Can't Extend Drives

Contrary to the picture painted above, the news was not all bad for the Badgers on the offensive side of the ball in 2018. One element did its job and performed the way they expected to: the running game. Running back Jonathan Taylor was phenomenal in his first season for the Badgers last year, and his sophomore campaign was even better. Taylor was so good that he took home the 2018 Doak Walker Award, given annually to the best running back in the nation. Taylor is a deserving winner, and the numbers don't lie in this case - Taylor's yards per carry jumped from 6.6 in 2017 to 7.1 this season, even as he shouldered a larger workload by getting an extra two touches per game on average - 23.3 this season compared to 21.3 last year.

In fact, Wisconsin's rushing offense in general - incorporating Taylor and his backups, particularly senior Taiwan Deal - was as good as advertised. FootballOutsiders.com's S&P+ metric, which grades teams on their efficiency and explosiveness and adjusts the result to account for a team's level of competition, had the UW running game ranked No. 3 in the nation this year after ranking them No. 24 in 2017. The big plays were there, too. The Badgers averaged more running plays of 10, 20, and 30 or more yards per game this year than they did last year. In short, apart from a few inexcusable fumbles by Taylor early in the season, Wisconsin's running game did everything the Badgers expected them to.

But there's a catch - Wisconsin's running game was working about as well as you could have expected it to, but "averages" are just that. There were plays where Taylor got more than seven yards per carry, and there were plays where he got less than that. And when Wisconsin's ultra-efficient running game stalled out, like all offenses do from time to time, the Badgers weren't able to make the plays they needed to extend drives and give themselves a chance to put points on the board.

In short, when Wisconsin's offense was "on schedule" - picking up 50 percent of the remaining yardage on first downs (for example: getting five yards on a routine 1st-and-10), 70 percent on second down, and 100 percent on third and fourth down the Badgers were hard to stop. But if a team could disrupt them, or if the Badgers shot themselves in the foot with pre-snap penalties and drops in the passing game, it was hard for UW to recover. When you go from completing 48 percent of your third downs in 2017 to just about 40 percent the next year, you're going to run in to issues as you try and put points on the board - especially if you can't make big plays down the field, which is something we will get to in a little while.

Self-inflicted wounds hurt just as much

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